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Introduction 
The debate on eurozone reforms has gained fresh momentum in 2018: The German and French governments 
put forward reform proposals for the euro area in the joint Meseberg declaration in June and agreed on a com-
mon eurozone budget in November. One building block under discussion is a fund to stabilize national 
unemployment insurance schemes. In October, the German Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) outlined one 
such re-insurance scheme. The basic idea behind the BMF proposal is to grant loans to national unemployment 
insurance systems in times of severe economic crisis in order to avoid aggravating (i.e., "procyclical") cuts in 
payments (benefits) to the unemployed or increases in contributions while the crisis lasts. This would create a 
re-insurance system for national unemployment insurance schemes designed to strengthen their role as "auto-
matic stabilizers" and making the eurozone more resilient in times of crisis.  
Reform proposals are also being discussed in academia. Recently, a group of 14 prominent French and Ger-
man economists put forward a set of reform proposals designed to strengthen both market discipline and risk 
sharing in the euro area (Bénassy-Quére et al. 2018). Under this proposal, the latter could be achieved by a sta-
bilization fund financed by contributions from the member states that would offer aid in major crises. However, 
the proposal stipulates that these payments should take the form of temporary transfers and not, as in the BMF 
proposal, loans. Criticism of a fiscal capacity is voiced in the annual report of the German Council of Economic 
Experts (Sachverständigenrat 2018). This would lead to misguided incentives and a "transfer union through the 
back door". The annual report contains a minority vote by Isabel Schnabel, who would under certain conditions 
countenance an unemployment re-insurance scheme that is incentive-compatible. All council members empha-
size that evaluation studies on the expected effects of such an instrument are required so as to be able to weigh 
more soundly the positive and negative consequences.  
The study summarized here is the first analysis to evaluate an unemployment re-insurance scheme for the euro 
area as regards potential stabilizing and redistributive effects. The results show that such a scheme can stabi-
lize economies in the euro area and could thus contribute to cushioning large labor market shocks. More 
specifically, this study runs a series of simulations to show that an unemployment re-insurance scheme would 
have had a counter-cyclical effect in all euro area countries during the simulation period and would not have led 
to permanent transfer payments. The novel feature of the study is that it separates the stabilization effects of the 
unemployment re-insurance scheme into two channels relevant to the current political debate: First, it indicates 
the potential for stabilization through payments between countries (so-called interregional stabilization). Stabili-
zation through this channel arises because labor market fluctuations differ across countries, i.e., shocks are not 
completely "symmetric". Second, the study estimates the so-called intertemporal stabilization potential. This 
channel describes the stabilization that member states can achieve when taking out loans in times of crisis and 
repaying them in good times. Thus, this channel is indicative of the stabilization potential of loan-based re-insur-
ance models as set out in the BMF proposal. The distinction between the two stabilization channels is crucial for 
assessing the possible value added of different reform options. Intertemporal stabilization can be achieved 
through national debt or through financial assistance programs of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 
the case of loss of market access. By contrast, interregional stabilization only arises by pooling contribution pay-
ments within a common fund and disbursing transfers from it if a member state is hit by a large labor market 
shock. 
Methodology 
The study uses Eurostat household micro-data from the European Labour Force Survey (LFS) and from the EU 
Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) to analyze labor market developments and the resulting in-
come fluctuations in the 19 current euro area member states over the period 2000-2016. The study runs 
simulations to calculate the stabilization and distribution effects of the stabilization fund (the re-insurance) on the 
assumption that it would have been introduced for the euro area in the year 2000.  
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The following limitations of the analysis must be taken into account when interpreting the results: The analysis 
assumes that in the counterfactual scenario (i.e., with the fund in place) labor markets would have evolved in the 
same way as actual labor markets in the euro area did. If the macroeconomic stabilization effect of the fund had 
led to more favorable labor market developments, the financial flows could have been lower than shown in the 
study. Conversely, if the fund had led to negative incentive effects in the member states and consequently to 
less favorable labor market developments, the financial flows would have been greater. A further simplifying as-
sumption in the simulations is that the stabilization fund would have been available to all 19 current member 
states over the entire period under review. That is, the study assumes that all 19 consent to and qualify for the 
scheme.  
The stabilization fund analyzed in this study is designed as a re-insurance scheme for domestic unemployment 
insurance systems. In the simulations, it is financed by contributions paid by the member states in times of de-
clining unemployment, while payouts are only made in the event of major labor market shocks. In years with 
severe shocks, the risk is highest that national fiscal policy would be constrained and unable to provide sufficient 
stabilization. The empirical analysis stipulates two conditions to be met before any payouts from the re-insur-
ance scheme are triggered. First, the unemployment rate in a member state must be above the average of 
previous years. Second, the unemployment rate must rise sharply within a single year. These two conditions 
ensure that the fund is only "activated" during major economic crises. The study considers two variants with 
threshold values for the required rate of change in the unemployment rate of one and two percentage points. 
The level of the payment to national schemes is determined by the additional expenditure on unemployment that 
an average unemployment insurance scheme would have to bear in the corresponding year. As with typical in-
surance systems, payments received do not have to be repaid in subsequent years. A re-insurance scheme of 
this kind would have a countercyclical effect during booms and downturns and would prevent large labor market 
shocks from leading to increases in contributions or cuts in domestic unemployment benefits. 
Results 
The simulations show that unemployment re-insurance would have cushioned major labor market shocks in the 
euro area and the associated loss of income for employees by an average of 15 to 25 percent since the intro-
duction of the euro (see table below, column "Interregional"). In the crisis year 2009, the scheme would have 
granted eurozone countries an additional stabilization amounting to 14 billion euros. In particular, it would have 
stabilized the member states in which unemployment rose sharply during the financial crisis, e.g., Spain and Ire-
land. But also countries such as Finland, Austria and France would have been stabilized to a similar extent. The 
re-insurance scheme would have mitigated around 21 to 24 percent of the major labor market shocks in these 
countries. In the variant with a threshold value of one percentage point for the rise in the unemployment rate 
necessary for activation, some member states, including Germany, would also have received assistance in the 
early 2000s. This would have cushioned the income losses caused by rising unemployment in Germany in 2003 
by 17 percent.    
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Explanation: The coefficients in the first column ("Interregional") show 
the share of income losses caused by major labor market shocks 
(increase in unemployment rate of at least one percentage point and 
unemployment rate higher than the average of the last seven years) 
that would have been cushioned by the simulated re-insurance 
scheme. The coefficients in the second column ("Intertemporal") 
show the proportion that an average unemployment insurance sys-
tem in the eurozone would have cushioned through debt issuance. 
The coefficients in the third column show the total stabilization poten-
tial. The simulations are based on the assumption that the re-
insurance scheme and domestic unemployment insurance schemes 
are revenue neutral over the simulation period 2000-2016. 
The various stabilization effects delineated above would have been achieved by the interregional smoothing po-
tential of the fund, which results from different labor market fluctuations in the member states. This effect is 
economically significant. By way of comparison: the intertemporal stabilization potential of an average domestic 
unemployment insurance system is about 16 to 26 percent in the period under consideration (see table above, 
column "Intertemporal"). It should be noted that intertemporal stabilization can also be achieved through existing 
channels such as issuing national debt in times of crisis (assuming member states have market access). This 
stabilization channel was, however, only available to a limited extent in some countries in the course of the fi-
nancial crisis and its effects could also be rendered by the re-insurance scheme in these cases. 
The study also shows that the average annual payments by member states into the re-insurance scheme would 
have been less than 0.1 percent of GDP throughout the simulation period (see graph below). Some countries 
would have been net contributors and others net recipients (marked blue or green in the graph), but no member 
state would have made or received permanent contributions. All member states would have paid contributions 
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into the re-insurance scheme in at least three years. In the re-insurance variant requiring an increase in the un-
employment rate of at least one percentage point for payment, all member states except Belgium and Malta 
would have received payment from the scheme in at least one of the years under consideration.  
 
Explanation: The graph shows the simulated average annual net contributions of the EA-19 member states to the 
unemployment re-insurance scheme over the period 2000 to 2016, the maximum ("Max") and the minimum con-
tribution ("Min"). Negative contributions are transfers, so “Min” refers to the maximum transfer from the scheme. 
Considered re-insurance variant in this figure stipulates that transfers are made if the unemployment rate rises by 
at least one percentage point and the unemployment rate is higher than the average of the previous seven years. 
Conclusion 
The study presents an ex-ante evaluation of an unemployment re-insurance scheme for the euro area. Thus, 
the paper contributes to the current euro area reform debate, but neither strongly advocates nor rejects the in-
troduction of a re-insurance scheme. It does not establish whether or not the introduction of such a scheme is 
desirable in terms of overall welfare, but focuses on its stabilizing potential. The results suggest that a re-insur-
ance scheme can achieve significant stabilization compared to domestic unemployment insurance systems or 
loan-based re-insurance models due to its interregional stabilization potential. The analysis of intertemporal sta-
bilization also indicates that loan-based models can be effective. Overall, this study’s re-insurance scheme 
could have dampened major labor market shocks in the Eurozone by around 15 to 25 percent since the intro-
duction of the euro, thus almost doubling the stabilization that an "average" unemployment insurance system 
with no funding constraints would have achieved. The re-insurance scheme analyzed in this study would have 
been revenue neutral at euro area level over the period 2000 to 2016, but not for individual member states. Ac-
cording to the simulations, the average annual net payment is between -0.1 and 0.1 percent of GDP; notably, 
the re-insurance scheme would not have led to permanent transfers between the member states. 
In the early years of the period under review, the scheme would have built up surpluses that would have been 
depleted during the financial and economic crisis. Nevertheless, implementing an effective debt limitation would 
be necessary to counteract political pressure to bailing out the re-insurance scheme. In addition, it is important 
to structure an unemployment re-insurance scheme in such a way that the risk of negative incentives is mini-
mized as far as possible. Changes in economic behavior ("moral hazard") were not taken into account in the 
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simulations. As assumed in the simulations, the re-insurance system should only take effect in the event of ma-
jor shocks and cushion only part of the losses incurred as a result of a given crisis. The scheme’s availability 
could be linked to conditions, in particular compliance with European fiscal rules. Finally, the study stresses that 
unemployment re-insurance should be seen as one potential element of a larger and balanced reform package 
that contributes to enhanced market discipline, risk reduction and risk sharing. 
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